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Considered the largest casualty of the subprime mortgage crisis, Lehman Brothers began
issuing subprime home loans in 2000 (Williams 2010). By 2006, Lehman, together with its
subsidiaries, was originating nearly $50 billion in new real estate loans each month (Williams
2010). Like other Wall Street banks, Lehman sold AAA-rated collateralized debt obligations to
pension funds and endowments while maintaining large positions in lower-rated, but higher
yielding tranches of these same securities (McLean and Nocera 2010). In the second quarter of
2008, Lehman began reporting billion dollar losses on their real estate portfolio and reluctantly
raised $6 billion of new capital by issuing additional stock (Anderson and Dash 2008a).
Following the withdrawal of Korea Development Bank from negotiations to acquire the bank,
Lehman shares plummeted 45% in early September (Anderson and Thomas 2008; Anderson and
Sorkin 2008). On Wednesday, September 10th, Lehman announced losses of $3.9 billion
prompting the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to convene an emergency meeting to discuss
the firm’s solvency (Anderson and Dash 2008b). Without government funds forthcoming and
unable to galvanize investor support, Lehman entered the weekend amidst widespread
uncertainty and speculation. On Monday morning September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers filed for
chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, reporting assets in excess of $639 billion. Some suggest that
the fall of Lehman was a crisis of leadership and fault critical decisions made by individual
executives (McDonald and Robinson 2009). Others argue a more structural explanation,
implicating both the lack of regulation that allowed the crisis to build and the inaction of external
actors such as the Federal Reserve Bank and Treasury Department (McDonald 2015). Ward
(2010) was the first to suggest that Lehman’s own organizational culture may have precipitated
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the firm’s downfall. Through interviews with former executives, Ward traces the final twenty
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years of Lehman’s history and attributes its demise to a rigid organizational culture that resulted
in an “echo chamber” of hollow corporate ideology. Her analysis, however, paid little attention
to the institutional context of the financial sector and ultimately relied upon retrospective
accounts of the firm’s collapse solicited from Lehman executives in the aftermath of the crisis.
Continuing the work begun by Ward, the following analysis will demonstrate how organizational
culture, situationally enacted by Lehman Brothers’ employees across the organizational
hierarchy through intra-organizational interaction, was among the contributing factors expediting
the firm’s downfall. This research is the first to consider the fall of Lehman Brothers in its own
terms and as it happened. It relies on the content of emails sent by Lehman employees during the
weeks and months preceding the firm’s insolvency and demonstrates how distinct organizational
modifications of recognized institutional myths impeded the implementation of alternate courses
of action by those within Lehman Brothers even when confronted with evidence that existing
operations were ineffective.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior research establishes that organizational failure, defined by Vaughn (1999:273) as
“an event, activity, or circumstance, occurring in and/or produced by a formal organization, that
deviates from both formal design goals and normative standards or expectations, either in the
fact of its occurrence or in its consequences, and produces a suboptimal outcome,” is not the
result of chance, but rather the product of routine nonconformity within the systemic
characteristics that allow the organization to function (see also Vaughan 1996). Previous social
scientists attribute the causes of organization failure to three different analytic levels:
institutional environments, organizational characteristics, and individual cognition (Mone et al.

	
  

	
  
1998; Vaughan 1999). Organizations are embedded within institutional environments, but their
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environment is never a solitary one (Baum and Singh 1994). As such, institutional explanations
for organizational failure implicate the effects of other organizations either through resource
competition or networks of collusion (McGahan and Porter 1997; Barlow 1993). Others take a
more local view, arguing that the risk and uncertainty of individual actions produce microfailures capable of causing individual misperceptions and mistakes to accumulate when exposed
to organizational activities (Goffman 1974, Starbuck et al. 1978, Mone et al. 1998). Between
these positions stand those who ascribe the source of organizational failure to mechanisms of the
organization and divide these operations into structures, processes, and tasks (Vaughan 1999).
Organizational structures include the means by which information is shared and to what extent
work groups are isolated from one another, what Lazega calls “the micropolitics of knowledge,”
(1992). Organizational processes, such as accounting system idiosyncrasies, contribute to
organizational failure when extreme adherence paralyzes adaptation and adjustment (Diamond
1992). Technological factors lead to task-related causes of failure when only a handful of
employees possess the tacit knowledge required to operate the technology and are unable to
articulate this to colleagues (Collins 1981).
The sites at which these layers overlap are salient, as response to failure is informed by
social interactions within and across levels of analysis. Responses to organizational failure
constitute the accrual of historically situated cultural knowledge culminating in the alteration of
established social relationships (Tilly 1996). “Mistake, misconduct, and disaster are defined only
in retrospect when outcomes are known, and these meanings are historically contingent,”
(Vaughan 1999:283). To this, Deeds and Pattillo (2015) add that failure is an interpretive process
whereby members negotiate both the meaning of failure and responses to it. Current explanations

	
  

	
  
of organizational decline and failure postulate that individuals construct accounts that justify
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and legitimize deviant behavior following or in the face of organizational crisis (Vaughan 1996,
1999). Barmash clarifies this with the observation, “corporations are managed by men; and men,
never forget, manage organizations to suit themselves. Thus corporate calamities are calamities
created by men,” (1973:299 emphasis added). At the same time, organizational culture functions
to persuade employees of the security of the enterprise (Clarke and Perrow 1996). Organizational
culture is imbued with further false confidence and even arrogance when work groups and
individual leaders isolate themselves from the advice, criticisms, and attitudes of others within
the organization (Kroll et al. 2000). When effectiveness is trivialized and abandoned in the
pursuit of perceived legitimacy, the institutional environment itself has the potential to amplify
organizational vulnerability (Landau and Chisholm 1995). While all of these processes are
important, none occur in isolation. Individuals enact the same organizational culture under which
they are both enabled and constrained. Organizational culture is principally the product of group
interaction. It is initially produced by and thereafter reproduced through individual interactions
and informed by the institutional environment in which it is situated. Local interactions between
individuals construct organizational culture in ways that at times reaffirm, at times challenge,
and at times modify the institutional myths that define the environment. Vaughan suggests this
point in claiming “individual engagement in routine nonconformity can encompass violation of
normative standards and expectations that are either internal or external to the organization,”
(1999:281). As the case of Lehman Brothers demonstrates, conformity to organizational culture
possesses the potential to contribute to organizational failure, as well. The literature on
organizational failure would benefit from an institutional perspective that recognizes that
institutions are inhabited with action, while respecting the ability of the institutional environment

	
  

	
  
to inform these actions. An approach capable of traversing different levels of analysis and
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interpreting the interactions embedded within organizations is needed to move the field forward.
THEORETICAL RATIONALE
Toward the end of his incisive critique of the administrative regime under industrial
capitalism, Jurgen Habermas makes a seemingly innocuous observation. “In primitive stages of
social development,” he says, “the problems of survival – and thus man’s experiences of
contingency in dealing with outer nature – were so drastic that they had to be counterbalanced by
the narrative production of an illusion of order, as can be seen in the content of myth,” (1973
[1975]:119). Habermas holds that within industrial society expertise and efficiency supplant
myth as the functionaries of social cohesion, capable of monopolizing meaning-making (1973
[1975]). However, as ecological disaster looms, inequality worsens, “alternative facts” mount,
and people increasingly retreat to the comfort and consolation of familiar institutions, the use of
myth in shaping and propelling worldviews appears as prominently as ever. Reasserting the
significance of myth in no way constitutes a novel outlook. Long have social scientists
recognized that even “modern societies are filled with institutional rules which function as myth
depicting various formal structures as rational means to the attainment of desirable ends,”
(Meyer and Rowan 1977:345).
Just like the myths found in Habermas’ “primitive stages of social development” these
“institutional myths” bear a dual character: (1) They are rational explanations of social
phenomena that prescribe action and (2) they appear in idealized forms that enjoy presumed
legitimacy even if false (Meyer and Rowan 1977). By encouraging conformity to prevailing
institutional logic these myths can serve as powerful sources of both organizational continuity
and change. Neo-institutionalists remind us, “within any system having multiple levels or orders

	
  

	
  
of organization, primary levels of organization can operate as institutions relative to secondary
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levels of organization,” (Jepperson 1991:146). This bifurcation of institutions and organizations
is critical as institutions define the environment in which organizations operate. Organizations
conforming to rationalized institutional myths are more likely to be seen as legitimate, thereby
improving their access to resources and, as a consequence, their chances of survival (Meyer and
Rowan 1977). Thus, organizations will adhere to those institutional myths most likely to induce
perceptions of legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The processes by which institutional
myths are embraced and implemented by organizations, however, often eschew efficiency
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Previous scholarship has demonstrated that “the formal structures
of many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their
institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities,” (Meyer and Rowan
1977:341). As such, tension exists between the goals of operational efficiency and organizational
conformity to myth.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) maintain that organizations seek to avoid this forced choice in
one of two ways. By erecting ceremonial facades that celebrate the institutional myth apart from
the operational activities of the organization, firms can employ a “logic of confidence” that
serves as an outward manifestation of their legitimacy within the field. Alternatively,
organizations might “decouple” institutional myths from organizational practice by establishing
ambiguous goals and avoiding integration between organizational components. Hallett and
Ventresca (2006), by reasserting the role of everyday interaction and local practices, clarify how
work activities and institutional ideals are capable of becoming “loosely-coupled.”
Foregrounding the ways in which individuals make sense of and enact local practices and
institutional myths in everyday interaction, Hallet and Ventresca recount, “Although institutions

	
  

	
  
penetrate organizations, it is through social interactions that institutions are interpreted and
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modified as people coordinate the activities that propel institutions forward,” (Hallett and
Ventresca 2006:215). While the “organizational field” proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
as a unit of analysis may preserve the totality of relevant organizational actors, it does so at the
expense of displacing individual action and diminishing the dynamism of institutional change.
The organizational fields approach is carried off in a “macro-analytic drift,” losing sight of
organizations as venues for social interaction and obfuscating individual agency (Hallet and
Ventresca 2006; Hallet 2010). At the same time, it is inattentive to institutional overlap and
temporality, instead portraying institutions as inert and isolated from one another (Vallas and
Kleinman 2008). What is needed is a view of institutions as inhabited by people and a unit of
analysis that foregrounds the interactions between them. Institutions are not simply vessels in
which individuals and organizations are carried, nor can institutions be considered in isolation,
contained within an “organizational field.” Institutions are inhabited with interaction (Hallett and
Ventresca 2006; Hallett 2010). They are permeable and overlapping (Vallas and Kleinman
2008). Inhabiting new institutionalism with organizational activity and interactions garners a
more robust understanding of organizational culture and internal meaning-making processes
(Hallett 2010).
Applying the inhabited institution frame to portrayals of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
gives gravity to the charge that “institutionalists have given ground too readily to market-based
accounts of organizational change,” (Fligstein 1991:312). Certainly, “the market” is not itself an
actor. Market outcomes must be enacted by participants and the relationships of these
participants to the market are only given meaning through interaction. Adapting the second of
Herbert Blumer’s three premises, as suggested by proponents of inhabited institutions, is

	
  

	
  
instructive (Hallett and Ventresca 2006). “The meaning of [the market] is derived from, or
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arises out of, the social interactions that one has with one’s fellows,” (Blumer 1969:2). What
follows is an interpretive process, whereby the meaning of the market is modified and managed
(Blumer 1969). Thus, borrowing from Berger and Luckmann (1967), the market is a human
product not perceived as such. The institutional logic of the market penetrates the interactions of
market participants just as market interactions reenact this very institutional logic. The meanings
ascribed by market participants are local and immediate precisely because they are institutionally
embedded even if they are not recognized as such (Hallett and Ventresca 2006). The result is the
reification of institutional myths. However, when these myths “become endogenous to
organizations” they undergo further modification unique to their organizational constituencies
(Hallett 2010:70). The meanings of institutional myths within organizations are, therefore,
negotiated through localized interaction, but so too are the construction and transmission of
myths as well.
Through a process of “asymmetrical convergence” partitions previously separating
distinct institutions are dismantled allowing the institutional myths of one to invade and
transform the myths of another (Vallas and Kleinman 2008). The development of institutional
myths is not bound to a linear trajectory, as “institutions are not inert containers of meaning,”
(Hallett and Ventresca 2006:215). Occasionally, they are not “containers” at all. As the case of
Lehman Brothers illustrates, in the wake of global financial crisis, executives merged their own
guiding myth of “market efficiency” with the institutional myths of government. Following
increased interaction with regulators, executives began integrating notions of “American
exceptionalism” with the institutional myth of market efficiency. This process is termed
“asymmetrical convergence” because colliding institutions do not meet on the same terms. One

	
  

	
  
institution always assumes a position of dominance over the other, yet their positions are not
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static. Like the institutional myths they share, their statuses relative to one another are the
product of the interactions between and among those who inhabit them. They are fluid,
overlapping, and inhabited. Adopting an inhabited institution perspective illuminates how the
organizational modifications of the institutional myth of market efficiency contributed to the
acceleration of Lehman Brothers’ failure.
METHODS
In order to evaluate how distinct organizational modifications of the institutional myth of
market efficiency hastened Lehman’s decline, I analyzed 924 emails and internal memoranda
that were sent and received by Lehman employees during the two years immediately preceding
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Emails often included between four and six correspondents,
but exchanges between as few as two employees or as many as twenty were not uncommon. All
told, these emails represent the work of 196 employees and total 487 pages of transcribed text.
The Chicago law firm Jenner and Block compiled these documents in late 2008 during the
discovery period of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceedings and the preponderance of
emails collected are dated between January and September 2008. As a result of the bankruptcy
hearing, all of the emails included in this research entered the public record and are now
available upon request.
The research question “How do distinct organizational modifications of recognized
institutional myths impact organizational failure?” guided the initial coding as I categorized the
data according to the conceptual components of interest appearing in each email (Charmaz
2006). The second time through the data I applied axial coding in order to further examine the fit
of those categories identified, with particular attention given to how negative cases informed the

	
  

	
  
suitability of the categories that emerged (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Locating common themes
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among the conceptual components discovered during initial coding, I collapsed the data into
three focused codes: “market expectations, “just the way it is,” and “good guys versus bad guys.”
Following this second time through the data, I chose to narrow the scope of analysis to include
only those emails coded “good guys versus bad guys.” This was the largest data group and
included the greatest collection of individuals in leadership positions. Due to its size and the
authority wielded by those represented, this was the only data group to receive additional
treatment. Two rounds of non-exclusive, selective hierarchical coding followed whereby I
further scrutinized those emails already coded “good guys versus bad guys.” Each email
appearing within this portion of the dataset received coding related to the organizational actors
identified and discussed therein. I followed a non-exclusive paradigm during this portion of
coding with many emails being assigned more than one code, including, among others:
“competitors,” “regulators,” and “rating agencies.” In order to establish a modicum of coder
reliability, I completed this process twice and include only those emails coded the same way
during both rounds in the final analysis and subsequent presentation of results.
As the institutional literature suggests that “the evolution of organizational language” is
paramount to understanding organizational action, I took great care in both preserving and
foregrounding respondent voice and temporal order within the data (Meyer and Rowan
1977:349). During initial coding and axial coding only the content of each email was considered.
The author, recipient, and date upon which each email was sent did not factor in how data were
coded during these first two rounds of analysis. Emails, however, are like bonds in that you
cannot always take them at face value. The salience of temporality and the relationships between

	
  

	
  
correspondents subsequently arose and both elements factored in the final stage of hierarchical
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coding.
The emails used as illustrations in the sections to follow are reproduced in their entirety.
While only a handful of emails appear in the subsequent sections, they are representative of the
themes expressed and exhibited by a great deal more. Those that do appear were selected for
inclusion on the basis of how fully they embodied the theme referenced as well as their
accessibility to those without previous exposure to the mechanisms of the financial crisis. Every
effort was made to present the emails as they appear in court documents, preserving
abbreviations, errors, and formatting when they do not impede coherence. Any corrections or
clarifications made to the emails appear within brackets. I judged these bracketed changes to the
original text to be necessary due to the frequent incidence of jargon as well as the use of stock
ticker symbols in place of company names. In the interest of space, brackets are also
occasionally used to identify those additional recipients not making contributions during the
portion of the email chain presented. Ellipses signify that a portion of the email has been omitted.
However, only salutations and inessential quantitative material was subject to deletion. The
figures following each email correspond to unique document identification numbers used by the
United States Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District Of New York to reference each
exhibit in the Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 filing.
RESULTS
The belief that markets constitute the pinnacle of efficiency serves as the institutional
myth around which action is oriented in the financial sector. Codified in the form of the
“efficient market hypothesis,” the institutional myth exists to legitimize not only the operation of
markets, but also their outcomes. Market outcomes are justified as utility maximizing, which is

	
  

	
  
to suggest that they secure the greatest possible good for the greatest number. First articulated
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by Eugene Fama, the efficient market hypothesis maintains that market actors seek to maximize
utility and will consider all available information in fashioning rational expectations to guide
their behavior in the market (1965, 1970). When new relevant information becomes available,
actors will adjust their expectations and appropriately alter their behavior in accordance with a
preference for maximizing their utility (Fama 1965, 1970). Market outcomes are, thus, the
aggregate of all decisions made by actors in pursuit of their own self-interest and, in this way,
deemed to be efficient. The myth of market efficiency is scientized through the theoretical
models and recondite calculations of economic think tanks and university researchers, celebrated
with Nobel prizes and the prestigious titles awarded to its champions, and enshrined in the
curriculum of highly acclaimed business schools. Indeed, the efficient market hypothesis has
even proliferated beyond the financial sector to become a principal tenet of neoliberalism
(Harvey 2005).
Lehman Brothers, like all firms in the financial sector, respected the legitimacy of the
efficient market hypothesis as the prevailing institutional myth through which market outcomes
were understood and interpreted. During the company’s fourth quarter earnings call in 2006, at a
point when Lehman Brothers seemed poised for unrestrained growth, Chris O’Meara, the chief
financial officer at the time, reported record revenue, adding:
Underpinning these results was a favorable market environment, where business
momentum picked up throughout the quarter. Although GDP growth continued to
slow in most major economies over the period, global equity markets rose 6% in
local currency terms during the quarter, due to better-than-expected corporate
profitability, a decline in oil prices, and the market’s anticipation of the end of the
federal reserve interest rate tightening…
The quickening pace of regulatory change could also serve as a catalyst for capital
markets activity next year. Pension reform in the U.S. and Europe, Basel II,
Regulation NMS on the New York Stock Exchange, MiFID or Market and
Financial Instrument Directive in Europe, and penny pricing increments for U.S.

	
  

	
  
options are all issues that will come into pay in 2007. We also see the forces of
disintermediation continuing in 2007. For example, in the current year, Asia and
Europe combined have accounted for half of completed and announced M&A
volumes, 68% of equity issuance, and 48% of fixed income underwriting
volumes. All of these percentages are up significantly from the past. (Lehman
Brothers 4Q06 Earnings Call December 14, 2006)
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Enjoying unprecedented success, O’Meara explained the company’s optimistic outlook by
appealing to the tenets of market efficiency. According to the efficient market hypothesis a
“favorable market environment” is one that is unbridled by regulation, priced in the smallest
practical increment to allow for more precise measurements, and globally diversified across open
borders. O’Meara referenced each of these components in his earnings report. However, as
Lehman’s fortunes shifted, reliance on an undiluted market efficiency myth as an instrument of
meaning-making was muted. Calls for deregulation, commitment to meticulous measurement as
well as the attendant action it informs, and conviction regarding the benefits of global market
diversity all disappeared internally as Lehman Brothers began modifying the institutional
construct of efficiency prior to inhabiting the myth. These organizational modifications of the
institutional myth of market efficiency are among the contributing factors accelerating Lehman
Brother’s collapse. Rather than accept the efficient market hypothesis as a kind of market dogma,
Lehman Brothers crafted its own organizational modifications of the myth, which it then
operationalized. This modification process is seen in the emails made publicly available during
the firm’s bankruptcy proceedings. Employees use distinct Lehman modifications of the
efficiency myth, articulated within different cultural tropes, to make sense of market turmoil in
the weeks and months prior to the company’s demise.
Within the halls of Lehman Brothers the process of modification begins by qualifying the
institutional myth. The cultural tropes that emerge as a result have the capacity to encourage
unnecessary risk-taking when they assume a prophetic character or promise organizational

	
  

	
  
invulnerability to systemic problems. Rather than reject the myth, employees qualify its
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application. Thus, preserving the recognized legitimacy of the myth in a way that is consistent
with organizational aspirations. Wherever market efficiency is at odds with routine behaviors,
the myth is reformed to reflect new and distinct organizational narratives similar to the original,
but with divergent explanations for social phenomena. These organizational modifications are
then conveyed through cultural tropes and accelerated by local level reenactment. They become,
in effect, the localized version of the institutional myth. The processes outlined above are laid
bare, when Lehman Brothers is forced to defend its real estate portfolio following a highly
critical Barron’s magazine article.
Subject:

RE
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LBHI_SEC07940_111678-111683
Despite the redolent placement of quotations around “efficient,” Sellers is not dismissive of the
efficient market hypothesis. In fact, he opens his email with an appeal to its institutional
legitimacy claiming to have “learned efficient market theory in business school.” He is quick,
however, to resist its universal implementation arguing, “from time to time” the public market
gets it wrong. Whereas the efficient market hypothesis seems to demand that Lehman Brothers
reposition its real estate portfolio, a reallocation it does not have the liquidity to accomplish, the
above modification of the myth permits intermittent inefficiencies when “the public market gets
valuations and even directionality” wrong. This modification of the efficiency myth allows for
“market overreactions” and indicates that during these occasional periods of instability “the
important thing to remember… is to look at longer term fundamentals” and act in the investors
best interest. Too many investors, Sellers warns, “have rushed to liquidate” positions only to
regret it later.
Lehman Brothers’ organizational modifications of the market efficiency myth are
communicated internally and carried forward externally using two cultural tropes, which profess,
“markets always recover” and “good guys always win.” Together, these modifications foster a

	
  

	
  
measure of organizational arrogance as they promote an impression of invulnerability. During
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periods of market instability bad firms fail, leaving the “good guys” to prosper when the market
ultimately rebounds. This perspective motivates inaction under the pretense that “good guys” are
insulated from short-term market volatility. Prior to its collapse, Lehman Brothers executives
rejected at least five documented offers to sell the bank and avert the company’s subsequent
bankruptcy (Table 1).
Potential Buyer
Achieved all-time high on
China International Trust
Investment Corporation
Kuwait Investment Authority
Korea Development Bank
Warren Buffet
Korea Development Bank
bankruptcy

Date of Offer
April 27, 2006

Date Declined
in advance of 2-1 split

Share Price
at the time
of Rejection
$156.01

c. September 2, 2007 September 4, 2007

$56.46

January 8, 2008
January 31, 2008
March 28, 2008
August 22, 2008**
September 15, 2008

$57.82
$66.00
$37.64
$7.79
$0

c. January 10, 2008
February 1, 2008
March 31, 2008
September 9, 2008

!

Table 1 – Proposed acquisition offers by date

** Korea Development Bank’s August 22nd offer was solicited by Lehman Brothers.

In the above email, Sellers modifies “market efficiency” toward the propitious promises of these
two tropes declaring, “There may be points in time when transactional volume is limited, but this
will change, and the implicit value of the assets will become obvious to the market.” The
reference to the assets’ implicit value suggests that while the market may be incapable of
determining the value of assets during occasional periods of inefficiency, Lehman Brothers
appreciates their value because they “look at longer term fundamentals.” Sellers is convinced
that Lehman will survive the current downturn because Lehman does business the right way by
acting on behalf of investors and operating with a long-term view.

	
  

	
  
Good Guys Always Win
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Lehman’s modifications are ardently defended by the firm’s executive management, as
evidenced in the following exchange between chief executive officer Dick Fuld and his mentor,
chief legal officer and Columbia University Professor Thomas Russo. Anticipated by Meyer and
Rowan (1977), amplification of compensatory ceremonies of confidence is characteristic of
organizational structures increasingly reliant upon the legitimacy of institutional myths.
Subject:

Tom
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LBHI_SEC07940_033997
Vindicated by their “huge brand with treasury,” the exchange juxtaposes the “good guys” at
Lehman with the “bad hedge funds.” It is the “bad hedge funds” that have caused the market to
operate inefficiently and need to be “killed” or “regulated” by Treasury. Thankfully, Lehman is
“special” and knows how to weather periods of market inefficiency. While the Treasury
Department seeks to induce a return to efficiency by implementing mark-to-market standards,
capital standards, and liquidity standards, Lehman Brothers will continue to operate “for the right
reasons” and “make things better for the company and country.” By exercising its “ability to
change things for the better,” Lehman secures its standing among the “good guys,” which is
crucial because “the good guys do prevail.” Thus, by doing things the right way and for the right
reasons, the pair believes that Lehman can insulate itself from market instability without
practicing the behaviors prescribed by the market efficiency myth. This mutually reinforcing
deployment of the “good guys win” trope signals each correspondent’s confidence and
commitment to maintaining the modification in the face of mounting external uncertainty.
Commenting on this type of action, Meyer and Rowan note, “The more an organization’s
structure is derived from institutionalized myths, the more it maintains elaborate displays of
confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, internally and externally,” (Meyer and Rowan 1977:358
original emphasis). This is true for modifications of those myths as well. As organizational
identity is increasingly defined by myth modification, ceremonies of confidence and group
solidarity come to dominate organizational behavior.

	
  

	
  
The “good guys always win” narrative is embraced and repeated throughout the
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organization as a legitimizing trope. It is deployed and enacted in ways that both amplify and
further adapt the organization’s particular iteration of the institutional myth from which it
derives.
Subject:

RE: Lehman real estate exposure

LBHI_SEC07940_398653
McGee’s email finds the senior executive invoking Lehman’s “good guy” narrative. For McGee
embodying the “good guy” role is about more than modifying a decoupled institutional myth. It
is about concrete action. McGee explains that by “creating a vehicle” capable of facilitating the
transfer of illiquid collateralized debt obligations (CDO) “to our share holders,” Lehman can “get
out of the ‘are we marked’ correctly game,” thus limiting its exposure to further losses by exiting
its CDO positions. Here, myth modification motivates action. He implicitly draws upon
Lehman’s other dominant trope: “markets always recover,” to assure his colleagues that the
shareholders will “get upside” when values inevitably bounce back. McGee’s proposed, and
subsequently enacted, strategy is undergirded by the importance of preserving the perception that
Lehman is the “good guy” for doing the right thing for its investors. He makes explicit reference
to a “good bank/ bad bank” dichotomy, but remains confident that “some creative thinking” can
secure a win for “the home team.”

	
  

	
  
Markets Always Recover
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Myth modification also motivates inaction. The firm’s chief strategist, Dave Goldfarb,
foregrounds Lehman’s “markets always recover” trope to counsel the refusal of foreign
investment by the state-owned and operated China International Trust Investment Corporation
(CITIC). At a time when the efficient market hypothesis suggests Lehman should be
deleveraging and plying every opportunity to shrink its balance sheet, Goldfarb mobilizes a
familiar modification to motivate executive inaction and dismiss a capital infusion from CITIC.
Subject:

RE: CITIC
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The reassurances Goldfarb and Fuld elicit from one another amplify myth modification.
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Goldfarb calls upon the “markets always recover” trope to explain why a CITIC investment is
unnecessary to “help them out of this market mess.” At the same time, he is worried that
accepting such an investment would dilute shareholders and jeopardize Lehman’s position as a
“good guy.” Fuld vindicates Goldfarb’s assessment and instructs him to “tell them [no further
interest].” In return, Goldfarb validates Fuld by agreeing “1000 percent.” He continues that
though their quarterly earnings are “not terrible, not great,” markets always recover and they are
prepared “to rock and roll for rest of year.” At this point, Goldfarb and Fuld return to the familiar
“good guys always win” narrative.
Throughout this interaction, Goldfarb and Fuld are so engrossed in propping up and
expanding organizational modifications that they are unable to recognize how their inaction
imperils Lehman’s very existence. Both reaffirm the other’s reliance upon local myth
modifications. They find in one another mutual support for employing the organizational tropes
to justify inaction. Goldfarb speculates that accepting the investment may “signal a major stress
sign (which obviously isn’t true)” while Fuld suggests that “if it’s just about price,” Lehman has
no further interest. Both use the combination of prevailing modifications resulting from their
interaction to portray Lehman Brothers as stable and not in need of foreign investment.
Asymmetrical convergence between government and Wall Street further fuels this
perception of predestined prosperity within Lehman. An August 2007 Federal Reserve bailout of
Countrywide Financial, increases the level of scrutiny and attention from government regulators,
who possess their own institutional myths. Increased coordination between Lehman employees
and government regulators occasions a collision between the institutional myths that organize
their respective fields. Following protracted exposure to and cooperation with regulators

	
  

	
  
beginning in August 2007 with government intervention in the credit market and carrying
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through to the firm’s September 2008 bankruptcy, Lehman employees began incorporating the
government’s institutional myth of “American exceptionalism” into modifications of their own
market efficiency myth. The prior email between Fuld and Russo serves as a perfect illustration.
“Good guys” prevail not only because they do the right thing for the company, but also because
they “make things better for [the] country.” In the previous email Fuld and Goldfarb denounce
what they see as Chinese stupidity and express a tepid confidence in the conventions of
American government. As Lehman employees interact with regulators with greater regularity,
the incorporation of “American exceptionalism” within modifications intensifies following a
temporal arch, which can be traced through email exchanges. To briefly illustrate, consider that
in September 2007, employees are hopeful that the “Fed will be accommodating and helpful,”
but by April 2008 they are proclaiming that Lehman “will make things better for [the] country.”
This convergence does not, however, constitute an institutional shift. Lehman is not becoming a
government agency, nor does it desire to do so. Lehman employees are forced to interact with
government regulators more routinely and so must navigate new and disparate views of
legitimate action. As such, Lehman employees use “American exceptionalism” normatively
within their myth modifications to legitimize existing behaviors and position themselves among
the good guys.
While modifications consistently culminate in the articulation of at least one of Lehman’s
two dominant cultural tropes, that is: “markets always recover” and “good guys always win,” as
above, these modifications are achieved by discrete action occurring in varied ways. Those who
do not occupy leadership positions at Lehman Brothers, for example, construct modifications
quite differently from firm executives.

	
  

	
  
Subject:

RE: Initial results for resi and commercial exposure.
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The cadre of middle managers in the above exchange expands the process of myth modification
such that the hallmark of the “good guy” is entirely relative. Unlike the company’s executives,
these Lehman employees do not view “good” as absolute, but rather anchored against the actions
and positions of marketplace competitors as well as the expectations of rating agencies. When
deciding how to report the firm’s real estate exposure, this group is preoccupied with “what Fitch
does” and what is “true for competitors” rather than asking which reporting method would be of
greatest benefit to the shareholders, as we might expect of Lehman’s executive leadership. This
should not be taken to mean that lower-level employees do not invoke the same modifications as
those situated higher up in the organization. This is simply a different construction of the same
modification; one in which “goodness” is determined in relation to other organizations

	
  

	
  
occupying the institutional environment. Middle managers still produce meaning in terms of
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“good guys” and “bad guys.” Yet, they only recognize one through its opposition to the other.
Lehman is not just a “good guy,” but “very good… when compared to Merrill Lynch.”
Incorporating a relative perspective produces the same modification by different means.
This employee group’s relational construction of what constitutes “good” organizational
conduct reveals how mechanisms of mimetic isomorphism are more active and intentional than
previously theorized. DiMaggio and Powell first explicated mimetic isomorphism saying,
“Models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or
explicitly by organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations,” (1983:151).
The above wrangling with whether to include real estate available for sale in calculations offers a
view of mimetic isomorphism as practiced at the local-level. This perspective counters the view
that “…organizational change is unplanned and goes on largely behind the backs of groups that
wish to influence it,” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:157). Lehman Brothers’ middle management
demonstrates that mimetic isomorphism can be a reflective process rather than a reflexive
response. Far from coalescing out of the ether, mimetic isomorphism is consciously pursued by
Lehman employees in consultation with one another. These managers actively deploy
isomorphism as a method to simultaneously modify institutional myth and legitimize resulting
modifications. For this group, the efficient market myth is not a normative feature of finance, but
a fluid function contingent on competitors’ calculations. Organizational behavior can be
evaluated only in relation to other organizational actors. As Lehman occupies a favorable
position relative to some competitors, Lehman is perceived as “good.”
Institutional myth modification is enacted at all levels of Lehman’s organizational
hierarchy, but while it is always oriented toward the same end, its construction takes different

	
  

	
  
forms. Both analysts and executives reproduce distinct Lehman modifications of the efficient
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market myth through interaction. The resulting “markets always recover” and “good guys always
win” narratives serve as instruments of sense-making during periods of uncertainty.
In fact, the only irredeemable transgression seems to be the failure to modify the myth at
all. Voicing his concern regarding the magnitude of Lehman’s illiquid assets, Matthew Lee, a
senior vice president of global finance inhabits the institutional myth of market efficiency
unaltered. He is quietly laid-off less than two weeks later.
Subject:

Personal and Confidential

LBHI_MFR 2010-04-26
Lee, despite the protestations of management to the contrary, does not believe that Lehman is
capable of discerning “realistic and reasonable” asset valuations absent an efficient market. More
condemningly, he refuses to indulge the belief that markets always recover and presses the firm’s
leadership to recognize “that it probably cannot buy or sell” many of its holdings “given the
current state of the market’s overall liquidity.” Lee implores his superiors to dispense with the
delusion of inevitable market recovery and instead acknowledge “current market values.” By
appealing to the established and broadly accepted institutional legitimacy of market efficiency,
Lee’s trepidation threatens to supplant Lehman’s myth modifications with the myth itself. Lee

	
  

	
  
asks Lehman to abandon the pretense that “good guys always win” and accept a momentary
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defeat so that it can ultimately survive. Instead Lehman abandons him.
CONCLUSION
Lehman’s organizational culture emerged from distinct modifications of the institutional
myth of market efficiency and engendered an inhabited organizational arrogance that contributed
to the acceleration of the organization’s failure. Previous scholarship implicates deviance and
routine nonconformity in organizational failure. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
demonstrates that wonted organizational culture and conformity to it can be just as pernicious.
Considering, for the first time, the fall of Lehman Brothers as it happened, this piece situated an
analysis of company correspondence within an inhabited institutions perspective to reveal the
ways in which local-level reenactment of organizational culture can contribute to the acceleration
of organizational failure. The inhabited institutions perspective deployed in this piece allows us
to see how employee interaction acted as the vehicle for myth modifications. An inhabited
approach emphasizes the role of group behavior, which is to say that it affirms the transformative
potential of people doing things together. The construction of organizational modifications of the
efficient market myth by Lehman employees in the weeks and months preceding bankruptcy
diverted attention from the firm’s risk of insolvency and fostered a shared sense of
invulnerability to institutional trends. Adopting an inhabited approach demands acknowledgment
of the importance of local interaction in shaping the organizational culture and demonstrates how
particular modifications come about through interaction in ways that qualify, negotiation, and
transform the meaning of the myth. For Lehman, the product of employee interaction was an
organizational culture incapable of either foreseeing or forestalling the ineffective operations that
hastened the firm’s decline. Lehman Brothers was not the first, largest, or most highly leveraged

	
  

	
  
firm to experience insolvency as a result of the Great Recession, but it was the only investment
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bank to declare bankruptcy during that period. It is time to count Lehman’s organizational
culture among the many factors contributing to its failure.
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